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The damage wrecked by the bursting of asset bubbles can have a devastating impact on 
investors' fortunes. In the Internet bubble, some US$8 trillion of shareholder wealth was 
destroyed. What is even more pertinent, however, is how the popping of a bubble can create a 
financial crisis, impacting nations and their economies. As a result, understanding how to identify 
bubbles is an important first step in combating these speculative bubbles, with interested parties 
ranging from the academic and investment community to central bankers and policy makers. 
Yu Jun, a professor of economics and finance, the director of Sim Kee Boon Institute for 
Financial Economics, and co-director at the Centre for Financial Econometrics, Singapore 
Management University (SMU), has researched on the detection of bubbles and the dating of its 
origination and termination. Speaking at a talk organised by the CFA Institute, Yu noted that 
while some economists will say that it is not possible to know if a bubble exists before it pops, the 
identification of bubbles is an area of study that is of great importance to policymakers, given its 
broad impact on the economy. 
In fact, Donald Kohn, former vice chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board once said, “Federal 
Reserve policy makers should deepen their understanding about how to combat speculative 
bubbles to reduce the chances of another financial crisis.” 
Believers in the efficient market hypothesis, the bedrock of the study of financial analysis, should 
deny that bubbles even exist since, in theory, they believe that the markets have priced in all 
information, including future expectations, into asset prices, and hence, the price is “right”. 
Nonetheless, Yu defined a bubble as the deviation of price from its fundamentals. This price 
based on fundamentals is derived using the present value theory, specifically the dividend 
discount method, which sums all future dividends from the asset, discounting each of these cash 
flows to the present using the risk free interest rate. Any difference between the actual price and 
this price derived from these fundamentals then becomes the bubble component. 
Setting up the bubble test 
Analysing a time series of price data using statistical methods and hypothesis testing can reveal 
if the behaviour of the data is stationary, a random walk (unit root), or if it exhibits explosive 
behaviour. "Stationarity" means that the statistical properties of the data (i.e. the mean and 
variance) do not change over time while the trajectory of bubbles would exhibit non-stationary 
behaviour. 
In a paper published in 1988, two economics professors, Behzad Diba and Herschel Grossman, 
applied standard unit root tests to real US Standard and Poor’s Composite stock price index data 
from 1871 to 1986, testing stock price levels and differences for non-stationarity. They found 
support in the data for non-stationarity in levels but found stationarity in differences. Since 
differences of an explosive process still manifest explosive characteristics, these findings appear 
to reject the presence of a market bubble in the data. 
Further tests provided confirmation of co-integration between stock prices and dividends over the 
same period, supporting the conclusion that prices did not diverge from long-run fundamentals 
and thereby provides additional evidence against bubble behaviour. This approach was, 
however, criticised by another economist, G.W. Evans, in 1991. He argued that the time series 
that produces periodically collapsing bubbles manifests more complex bubble characteristics that 
cannot be shown by the standard unit root and co-integration tests. 
Evans argued further that standard unit root and co-integration tests are inappropriate tools for 
detecting bubble behaviour because they cannot effectively distinguish between a stationary 
process and a periodically collapsing bubble model. Patterns of periodically collapsing bubbles in 
the data look more like data generated from a unit root or stationary auto-regression than a 
potentially explosive process. 
Building on these works, Yu, with his colleagues, Peter Phillips and Wu Yangru, proposed a 
recursive right-tailed unit root test, or sup augmented Dicky-Fuller test (SADF), that would seek 
to identify the origination and termination dates of bubbles. 
“The system can detect exuberance in an asset price series during its inflationary phase and can 
serve as an early warning system,” said Yu. To test out the method, he has applied it to the real 
estate, mortgage backed securities, commodity, bond and foreign exchange markets, analysing 
the transmission mechanism of the bubbles. 
By implementing the right-tailed unit root test repeatedly on a sequence of forward expanding 
samples of data, it becomes possible to identify the origination and termination date of the 
bubble. These timestamps are when the Dicky-Fuller t-statistic exceeds a critical value, or 
significance level. 
Understanding bubbles 
In examining the internet bubble for the Nasdaq price index, using a five per cent critical value, 
this method shows the origination date of the bubble to be as early as June 1995, with the 
termination in July 2001, where the prices had by then already collapsed. The data used by Yu 
had stripped out the effects of inflation by converting the nominal series to a real series using the 
consumer price index, and covered the period from February 1973 to June 2005, comprising 389 
monthly observations. 
Both price and dividend grew steadily from the beginning of the sample until the early 1990s. The 
price series then began to surge and the steep upward movement in the series continued until 
the late 1990s as investment in dot-com stocks grew in popularity. Early 2000 saw the price 
abruptly drop and it continued to fall to the mid-1990s level. The dividend series, on the other 
hand, had remained steady throughout the sample period.  
The t-statistic for the dividend series also shows no such explosive behaviour as the price series, 
which indicates a departure of the price from the fundamentals. Curiously, Alan Greenspan, then 
chairman of the US Federal Reserve had made his famous remark in December 1996, coining 
the term “irrational exuberance”. He had asked, “How do we know when irrational exuberance 
has unduly escalated asset values?” The timestamp of the origination of the internet bubble 
predates Greenspan’s remark, hence providing empirical content to his remark. 
It is noteworthy that the bubble had continued strongly for another three years even after his 
cryptic warning, showing that just because a bubble has been identified does not mean that it is 
also due to pop any time soon. 
Bubbling up policy measures 
Extending this method to the subprime crisis, there appears to be a transmission of the growth of 
bubbles, starting with the Nasdaq price index during the internet bubble, then the home price 
index (from January 2001 to August 2007) followed by commodity prices such as crude oil 
(March 2008 to August 2008), bond price bubble (October 2008 to December 2008) and the 
GBP-USD exchange rate (from October 2008, and was still continuing when the study ended in 
2009). These classes all underwent bubble inflation and collapse, with Yu noting that “an 
economic story can be told of the bubble migration.” 
“This method will provide dates of origination and collapse but it uses historical data, and hence it 
does not have a predictive element,” Yu explained. From an investor who wishes to time the 
market, in a bid to buy low and sell high, the method might not be directly relevant. However, if 
regulators had a method to identify potential bubbles, such as the one proposed by Yu, they 
could then be able to introduce policy measures in a timely manner for maximum effect. 
Turning his attention to the Singapore real estate market, the method identified two periods of 
bubble price behaviour in the last five years. The first ran from May 2007 to late 2008, while the 
second began in October 2009, and is still continuing. With recent policy measures intended to 
cool the property market, these initiatives may appear timely to create a soft landing as opposed 
to a bubble implosion, which may have a destabilising effect on the economy. 
Given the implications of his work, these techniques have received a great deal of interest from 
several central banks and policymaking bodies, including the Monetary Authority of Singapore, 
the Urban Redevelopment Authority of Singapore, and the central banks of Hong Kong, China, 
Korea and Canada. If indeed an early warning system can be designed to accurately demarcate 
bubble territory for financial assets, policy measures can be executed before damage is wrought 
on the economy. 
 
